In a converging world, where borders between countries are surpassed in the digital environment, it is necessary to develop 
INTRODUCTION
The digital revolution transformed societies and created through the internet a truly global network for people to engage socially and economically across borders. However, this infrastructure is not yet sufficiently supported by widely recognized means to create trust. Digital identity management is essential for enabling trust in the digital sphere and the basis for trusted online services at the world wide level. This trust cannot be created without standardized procedures and secure, privacy enhancing, standardized technologies that give the individual actors certainty about key characteristics of the infrastructure they rely on with increasing dependency.
Trustworthy digital identity management is one of the key areas where further convergence is required to guarantee accountability, security and privacy. The associated challenges have been recognized and several international standardization efforts have been carried forward in this and related areas. These standards focus on frameworks for identity management [1, 2, 3] and authentication assurance [4] , identity proofing [5] , privacy [6, 7, 8] and access control [9] . These standards are introduced in more detail in section 2. An emerging, important area within the digital identity management field is attribute management and usage. In addition to the standard attributes included in passports and identity cards like name, gender, and date of birth attributes may relate to a person's health (e.g. blood group, allergies, vaccinations), school and university degrees (Bachelor, Master, Ph.D), professional occupations, memberships in organizations, hobbies, financial data (credit scores, status of bank accounts), and behavioral attributes (star rating on e-commerce sites, advertisement preferences, travel preferences). Certified attributes are of high value to service providers [10] and attribute based credentials can protect the privacy of users by facilitating pseudonymous as well as anonymous access to services [11] . Despite the emerging importance of attribute usage the need for standards and regulation in this area is not yet widely recognized. For example the proposal for the European eIDAS regulation [12] did not include attribute provisioning among the list of trust services [13] . In contrast the US "National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace" [14] does explicitly recognize "attribute providers". For these reasons the European thematic network SSEDIC (Scoping the Single European Digital Identity Community) has recently identified attribute management among the key areas in the identity management field which deserves more attention and calls for new standards in this area [10] .
In this paper we describe key aspects of attribute management that should be at the focus of standardization in order to facilitate interoperable, secure and privacy conserving attribute usage within a digital identification ecosystem at the global scale. In section 2 the relevant standards are briefly described, important open challenges are identified in section 3, the needs for future standardization to address these challenges are discussed in detail in sections 4 to 6, followed by the conclusions in section 7. 
STANDARDS FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
In this section we briefly present key existing standards in the digital identity management area as well as some standards under development. [12] .
An overview of the standards most relevant for this work is given in table 1. These important standards focus mainly on the specification of identity, the description and design of identity management frameworks, assurance levels and identity proofing. Most standards, however, do not make an explicit reference to the challenges related to attribute provisioning and management. The ITU-T X.509 [16] standards discuss "attribute certificates" but in a very restricted context focused on privilege management infrastructures. In particular it is assumed that the attribute is bound to "identification information about its holder". The recent ITU-T X.1255 standard [17] focuses on a framework for the discovery of identity management information including attributes based on a persistent identifier relying on a specific digital entity data model. This standard is an important step towards developing more homogeneous approaches to attribute management. In the following we will take a broad, bottom-up approach and point to important gaps in international standardization with regard to identity management and in particular attribute management and usage. Paying closer attention to attribute management within the digital identity management area is important in part with regard to privacy considerations. Standardization in this area will facilitate the use of certified attributes to enable efficient and privacy preserving transactions as only relevant user information is transmitted and certified. This enables minimum data disclosure and can therefore significantly enhance user privacy. However, we expect that addressing the open issues identified here will help to resolve existing interoperability and assurance assessment issues. Therefore many of the considerations below are applicable also in contexts where users are identified as a person.
OPEN CHALLENGES
For the purpose of identifying the open challenges for attribute management we propose a simple model for a digital identity. A digital identity is considered as a "set of attributes related to an entity" [1] . A very particular attribute is the "identifier": "One or more attributes that uniquely characterize an entity in a specific context. Within a particular context, an identity can have one or more identifiers to allow an entity to be uniquely recognized within that context." [5] We will therefore think of a digital identity as being composed of two parts: an identifier and a set of attributes which are linked to the identifier. Figure 1 shows an illustration of this concept. Examples are: the number of an electronic passport (identifier) which is linked to the user attributes in the set of passport data which include name, date of birth, etc. [15] . Another example is the customer number associated with a detailed set of user data (address, credit card information, purchase history) maintained by an online merchant. Another unique identifier used in this context could be the user's email address. In the latter case the user might actually never use the customer number but only its email address as an identifier towards the online merchant. We stress that the simple identity model is not supposed to capture "the identity" of an entity, but represents rather one of possibly many different descriptions that capture a small part of the entity's identity (i.e. a partial identity).
Based on this simple model of a digital identity we identify three central areas in which important open challenges for standardization remain (see figure 1 ):
• Management of identifiers (see section 4)
• Attribute management (see section 5), in particular attribute structure and format (section 5.1) and assurance (section 5.2)
• Linking attributes to digital identities (see section 6)
The first challenge is focused on important issues related to the "identifier". As noted above the identifier can be an attribute (like an email address) or a subset of attributes. In many cases such a solution is not ideal. Important issues relate to the "uniqueness" of such an identifier at the global level and how much information the identifier reveals about the entity it is assigned to. All these aspects must be considered with particular attention to issues of privacy, security and efficiency.
The second challenge draws attention to the fact, that attributes associated to an identity are usually not just an unstructured set of different parameters but can have important relations among them which must be accounted for. Further, more clarity about the format in which the values associated with the attribute are stored and processed is required. Finally, one must standardize the processes via which one would like to assign and measure the assurance level of attributes related to an identifier. This will require considerations that go beyond existing approaches to measure the assurance of digital identities.
The third challenge looks at the evolving aspects of a digital identity: over time attributes will need to be linked to (and sometimes removed from) a digital identity. In certain circumstances entire digital identities need to be linked as they evolve. In such a case different sets of attributes maintained by different organizations but referring to the same entity must be consolidated. Again, this rises important privacy, security, and assurance questions that should be addressed by future standardization.
In the following we discuss these open issues in depth and identify key elements that should be addressed in the near future.
IDENTIFIERS
Unique identifiers are the basis for efficient and secure identity management and are therefore essential to ensure global interoperability of identity management systems. However, this issue has not yet been comprehensively addressed by standardization. It is important to note that according to the definitions given in the previous paragraph there can be more than one identifier for an entity in a particular context and that uniqueness is limited to a context. So in many cases the context in which the identifiers are used and in which they are unique is not broad enough to ensure uniqueness at the global level and therefore a sufficient degree of interoperability. When identifiers are required that are unique at the global scale people therefore rely heavily on identifiers that are related to communication channels like email addresses and phone numbers where uniqueness is required by design (and often a consequence of the application of existing international standards). However, in many cases the association of a communication channel to the identity is not necessary and in these cases not privacy friendly. Further using a subset of the attributes associated with an identity as a unique identifier is usually not particularly privacy friendly and should be discouraged.
We therefore suggest that work is being initiated on the development of standards for procedures and techniques that support the distributed generation of globally unique identifiers for the purpose of identity management. A good starting point is ref. [17] . These unique identifiers should generally reveal no information about the entity to which they relate and it should be impossible to determine from identifiers alone whether they have been issued to the same entity. Further entities should be able to use multiple identifiers, some for one time use and others for repeated use in a certain context. Further standardized procedures and techniques (providing standardized levels of assurance) should be in place through which an entity can demonstrate that a unique identifier has been issued to it, ideally without revealing any of the associated attributes (if any).
Introducing a framework for reliably assigning unique identifiers at the global level facilitates several very important tasks for identity management. First it allows the creation of anonymous but unique credentials for one-time-use, for example in connection with certifying the age of a person in the context of one and only one transaction. The repeated use of a unique identifier (even if no further attributes are provided at all) also serves an essential purpose: it enables recognition; when used repeatedly a unique identifier becomes a pseudonym. It has long been realized that the ability to recognize a counterpart in a given context over repeated interactions is fundamental for recognizing behavior and establishing trust and cooperation [18] . Thus stable pseudonyms can serve as an important anchor to which attributes -including behavioral attributes -can be attached over time.
Finally the uniqueness of the identifier at the global level facilitates interoperability by preventing potential collision keeping the identity information that needs to be exchanged in global digital transactions to a minimum.
A STANDARDIZED APPROACH FOR ATTRIBUTE MANAGEMENT
In the following we turn to the standardization needs for the management of attributes which are associated to the unique identifier discussed in the previous section. The exchange of certified attributes has a great potential for business and users as it can provide the certified information which is needed in a given context with low overhead and without revealing additional information which is not strictly required (a principle known as "minimum disclosure"). For example instead of providing a date of birth only the information that the age of a person is greater or equal to 18 years could be revealed. However, if limited information is disclosed it is imperative that standardized procedures and protocols exist which ensure that the exchanged information is kept to a minimum and that there are now ambiguities. Therefore a possible logical structure within a set of attributes, the format in which attributes are stored, as well as the assurance associated with an attribute must be clear to the receiver (the "relying party") and compatible with its requirements before the actual value of the attribute -or values derived from it -are disclosed by the attribute provider.
In other words a standardized approach is needed for the exchange of metadata related to attributes. Further standardized procedures are required for verifying the compatibility between the information that is provided by the attribute provider and the information which is expected by the receiver (relying party) on the basis of the metadata. We now discuss some important aspects in this regard in more detail.
Attribute structure and format
While in the definition for identity in [1] a reference is only made to a "set of attributes" it is important to realize that many attributes assume a structure which is often hierarchical. To give a simple example a date is actual composed of three attributes (year → month → day) which have a hierarchical structure. Similar observations hold for addresses (e.g. country → region → city → district → street) etc. This structure has an important impact on the assurance of attributes as discussed in the next paragraph. Further attributes are provided in a given format. For example a date may be given in the format of month−day−year or, alternatively, day−month−year. Further the data have particular formats with regard to the length, the content type like numeric, alphabetic or alphanumeric, etc. Therefore it is imperative that potential misinterpretation are avoided in particular if later on derived values are communicated for example in form of "Yes" "No" statements.
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight that the structure that may underlie a set of attributes as well as the format of the attributes must be communicated clearly before an attribute is exchanged or an attribute based assertion is made. Therefore standardized procedures must be developed and implemented that help to ensure through the standardized exchange of metadata that there is a common understanding about the structure and the format of attributes between the attribute provider and the relying party before an attribute is actually exchanged. The less information is exchanged with regard to the value of an attribute the more important becomes a correct understanding of the metadata related to the attribute. In some areas like e-health but also with regard to financial or even behavioral attributes potential misunderstandings due to a lack of standardization in this area could result in serious consequences for users.
Attribute assurance
In this section we focus on the importance of developing standards for assessing the assurance associated with an attribute. Having standardized procedures and criteria on how to determine the assurance of an ascertain is extremely important for establishing trust in online transactions. While assurance levels have been defined for authentication in ref. [4] this standard does not cover attribute provision separately. Within the European Thematic Network SSEDIC and the STORK2.0 project steps towards defining assurance levels for attributes have been defined [19, 20] . However such efforts would need to be taken up and moved forward by international standardization. There are two critical tasks that need to be accomplished when assessing the assurance of an attribute: the quality of the link between the digital identity (represented by its unique identifier) and the attribute must be validated and the quality of the attribute must be determined [21] . We will discuss the problem of linking attributes to eIDs (electronic identities) in section 6.
Here we just point to a few issues that should be addressed by international standardization. First if an attribute is composed of sub-attributes (like an address) the overall assurance of the attribute "address" is limited by the weakest assurance of any of the sub-attributes (like "street name") but not by an unrelated attribute like "date-of-birth". Further great care must be paid to assess the quality of the attribute which includes assessing the quality of its source [21] . An important aspect to be considered in this context is whether the attribute provider is the "source" of the attribute (legally or as a consequence of its business model) or has just registered the attribute. In the latter case the attribute provider relied on some registration procedure whose quality must be evaluated as well. Another issue that should be considered is when the attribute has been validated by the attribute provider for the last time [21] . If, for example, a university issues a degree the University can be regarded as the authoritative "source" for certifying that a person has obtained this degree and that it has not been revoked. However, the University might not be an equally authoritative source for establishing the current address of this person as this is an information the University does not validate regularly. Consequently international standards should recognize that attribute providers might certify different attributes at different levels of assurance. This is an important difference with regard to the assurance schemes attributed to eIDs that implicitly assume that each attribute considered as part of the eID is certified at the same level of assurance.
A formalization of evaluation procedures and the assignment of appropriate assurance levels for attributes by international standards is urgently required.
User eID with user attributes and identification number from identity service provider in country A
Pension Fund Portal:
User attributes associated with identification number issued by pension fund in country B Figure 2 . Illustration for example 1 in section 6: Standardized procedures and techniques to match the attributes provided by the user's eID with the attributes in the records of the online service provider are missing.
A STANDARDIZED APPROACH TO LINK ATTRIBUTES TO EIDS
Today users have a large amount of eIDs issued to them by various entities including governments, financial institutions, social networks, online merchants and many other online service providers. The process of linking attributes to eIDs and vice versa as well as eIDs to eIDs will become of increasingly important. We give two examples to illustrate the underling challenges:
• Example 1 A person has worked in country B for a certain amount of time and has contributed to the pension fund in country B. The person lives now in country A and has obtained an eID from that country. With this eID the person now tries to access her records at the pension fund of country B. At this stage a link must be created between the person's eID and the record at the pension fund. This is easy if the identifiers associated with the eID and the record in the pension fund can be traced to the same root. However, this is generally not possible and may also not be always desirable. The pension fund might be able to check the consistency of the certified attributes associated with the eID and the record in its database and determine that they are consistent and that there is no collision. In this case it might request from the user to provide the identifier that has been assigned to her from the pension fund for additional verification. However, no work has been carried out that standardizes such procedures and gives some indication of the assurance that can be provided.
• Example 2 A person is submitting an online grant application to a funding agency in country B. She uses an eID issued in country A to authenticate to the funding agency but is asked to also certify that she obtained a University degree. The person might have obtained a PhD from a University in country C. In this case she might authenticate to the University in country C to request the issuing of the attribute assertion with a different eID than the one used for authentication to the funding agency (for example user ID and password obtained directly from the University). When the funding agency received the assertion from the University the difficult task for the agency is to establish with a certain degree of assurance that the attribute assertion issued by the University refers to the same person that authenticated to its portal with the eID issued in country A.
The examples above illustrate both the importance and the difficulties associated with linking attributes (or sets of attributes) to eIDs. In the above cases creating these links is clearly desirable. However, one should also keep in mind that there are many other use-cases where creating such links should be impossible or subject to high technical and procedural barriers to protect a user's privacy.
Approaches for establishing these links will likely rely on a combination of the following approaches
• knowledge based e.g. by verifying the user's knowledge of certain information related to her like the identifier from the pension fund in example 1
• secret based e.g. the user must demonstrate knowledge of a secret or show that she is in the possession of certain tokens
• ontology based [19] i.e. relying on ontologies for attribute management which support the creation of links between sets of attributes through probabilistic matching. This approach should also provide means to estimate the strength of the links created. This may for example include minimum criteria for matching certain key attributes associated with two different identities (and their identifiers)
Currently technical and procedural developments in this regard are still in their beginnings. Nevertheless early standardization of procedures can later on facilitate the establishment of standardized protocols to assign meaningful levels of assurances to the links created through procedures following these standards. In a second step even more complex issues could be considered in the framework of international standardization. Such issues include assurance under transitivity for example the level of assurance at which the funding agency in example 2 could in the future certify the University degree of the user to another party.
CONCLUSIONS
For several thousand years societies have learned to establish cooperation and trust in non-digital environments. A key requirement for creating trust is the ability to recognize coun- Figure 3 . Illustration for example 2 in section 6: Standardized procedures to asses the assurance of the link between a) the user who authenticated with the eID from country A and b) the user to whom the University degree attribute is provided to are currently missing.
terparts in repeated interactions [18] and to build communities of varying sizes that facilitate trust building between people and entities who do not know each other. The online community in the world-wide web is truly global and with the continued and increasingly urgent need to create, maintain and renew trust in this environment. Digital identity management plays a key role in enabling recognition and the creation of circles of trust. In this paper we have highlighted several areas within digital identity management where standardization is urgently needed to achieve further international convergence. We have argued that attribute management is of central importance to make continued progress in these areas. A standardized environment for the exchange of certified attributes is highly desirable for online service providers seeking certified information for those data items that are central for their business model as well as for users who would like to protect their privacy and obtain pseudonymous access to digital services. Progress in this area will be essential to enable increased interoperability between different independent digital identity management systems as pointed out in section 6.
While in this paper our focus is on attribute management and related challenges for which timely action is required, there are other areas for future standardization that should be addressed in the medium term. These include the application of process mining (in particular compliance checking and online support) for online authentications and authorization and related security relevant processes [22, 23, 24] and dedicated transport protocols for digital identity information. Such standards should take the differences between clientserver (request-response) and peer-to-peer protocols explicitly into consideration.
